Zambia Social Science Journal
Volume 6
Number 2 Indaba Agricultural Policy Research
Institute (IAPRI) Special Issue (2015/2016)

Article 5

2016

Achieving More with Less: Reform and Scaling Down of Food
Reserve Agency and Farmer Input Support Programme and
Boosting Social Protection
Antony Chapoto
Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute

Rhoda Mofya-Mukuka
Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute

Thelma Namonje-Kapembwa
Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute

Olipa Zulu-Mbata
World Food Programme, Lusaka

Brian Chisanga
Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/zssj
Part of the African Studies Commons, Food Security Commons, and the Social Welfare Commons

Recommended Citation
Chapoto, Antony; Mofya-Mukuka, Rhoda; Namonje-Kapembwa, Thelma; Zulu-Mbata, Olipa; and Chisanga,
Brian (2016) "Achieving More with Less: Reform and Scaling Down of Food Reserve Agency and Farmer
Input Support Programme and Boosting Social Protection," Zambia Social Science Journal: Vol. 6 : No. 2 ,
Article 5.
Available at: https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/zssj/vol6/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Zambia Social Science Journal by an authorized editor of
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

Achieving More with Less: Reform and Scaling Down
of Food Reserve Agency and Farmer Input Support
Programme and Boosting Social Protection
Antony Chapoto1, Rhoda Mofya-Mukuka1, Thelma Namonje-Kapembwa1, Olipa
Zulu-Mbata2 and Brian Chisanga1
1

Indaba Agricultural Policy Research Institute
2
World Food Programme, Lusaka

social protection. Despite evidence showing how the country’s signature farming
input and output subsidy programmes, i.e. the Farmer Input Support Programme
(FISP) and the Food Reserve Agency (FRA) respectively, have failed to spur
and stubbornly high rural poverty rates, the country has continued to allocate
grappling with the need to make some tough choices as it seeks to deliver on the
Zambia-Plus Recovery Plan proposed by the Minister of Finance. Among other
options, the government should consider how to scale back on discretionary
spending whilst supporting economic growth and social development. Politically,
maintaining the status quo is likely to be very costly given that the country can no
FISP and FRA. This paper presents a case for reforming FISP and FRA by providing
alternative approaches that will work better for both the individual Zambians
who rely on the state for support, and the country as a whole.
Key words:
Farmer Input Support Programme, Food Reserve Agency, Policy Reform, Social
Cash Transfer, Zambia
Introduction
social protection. Despite evidence showing how the country’s signature farming
input and output subsidy programmes i.e. the Farmer Input Support Programme
(FISP) and the Food Reserve Agency (FRA), respectively, have failed to spur
and stubbornly high rural poverty rates, the country has continued to allocate
currently grappling with the need to make some tough choices as it seeks to deliver
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on the Zambia-Plus Recovery Plan proposed by the Minister of Finance. Among
other options, the government should consider how to scale back on discretionary
spending whilst supporting economic growth and social development. Currently
FISP and FRA take up a large chunk of this discretionary spending (about 57% of
the agricultural budget in 2016 and 2017 respectively.The government needs to
carefully consider how these two programmes can be more effectively streamlined.
Box 1: Reality Check
• Rural poverty currently stands at 77% despite billions of Kwacha
spent on FISP and FRA (LCMS, 2015)
• Maize production has increased since the implementation of FISP and
in maize production have mainly been due to area expansion. Maize
yields have marginally increased and the level is very low and not
commercially or sustainably viable.
• Using the national nutrition indicators (wasting, stunting, and
underweight), the CSO’s Demographic Health Survey of 2014 reported
that 40% of children under 5 are stunted, with 17% being severely
stunted. Additionally, children in rural areas are more likely to be
stunted (42%) than children in urban areas (36%)
• The Global Hunger Index Report (2015) ranked Zambia among the
three countries with the worst rates of hunger in the World (IFPRI,
Welthungerhilfe & Concern Worldwide, 2015).

wasteful spending on agricultural subsidies. One school of thought advocates
for the status quo to be maintained, arguing that any responsible government
has an obligation to support its farmers to ensure food security and poverty
reduction. On the other hand, there are calls for the complete removal of the
spent do not match the sector’s growth, poverty rates, or productivity growth.
Notwithstanding the strong arguments to stop the subsidy programmes, the
political economy of these subsidy programmes usually leads to the status quo
being the most preferred despite the high cost to the nation.
Given the sensitivities around subsidies, Indaba Agricultural Policy
Research Institute (IAPRI) has been advocating for cost effective alternatives
that would not burden the treasury but help achieve sustainable agricultural
growth and poverty reduction. In particular, the Institute has consistently
recommended that the government move towards smart subsidy programmes
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market-oriented solutions such as expanding social cash transfers (SCTs) to the
poorest segments of the population in order to resolve the perceived problem
of rising mealie meal prices, as well as managing the strategic reserves through
the commodity exchange/warehouse receipts system.
Politically, maintaining the status quo is likely to be very costly given that
current operations of FISP and FRA. Government needs to make bold decisions
and implement reforms that will have more far-reaching positive impacts in the
agricultural sector. There is usually limited understanding of the opportunity
cost of having massive programmes of this nature. At the same time, stakeholders
do not understand when (for example) the government fails to pay farmers on
time despite the fact that the FRA often purchases maize at above the budgeted
target, or fails to fund the FISP e-voucher program.
Against this backdrop, this paper presents a case for reforming FISP and
FRA by providing alternative approaches that will work better for individual
Zambians who rely on the state for support, and the country as a whole.
Throughout the paper, we argue that it is not prudent to maintain the status quo
whilst simultaneously articulating alternatives that may enable the government
to scale back the subsidy programme without huge political backlash.
Can Zambia Afford to Continue on the Well-Trodden Path of Heavy Input
and Output Subsidies?
Given that more than 65% of the Zambian population depends on agriculture,
primarily through smallholder production, for their livelihoods and employment
(CSO, 2013), growth in the agricultural sector is the clearest avenue through
which poverty reduction can be achieved. Nevertheless, the current spending
strategy—which consistently prioritises ineffective and costly subsidies—
would not achieve this desired growth and poverty reduction. Notably, most of
the funds allocated to the sector over the years have been spent on fertiliser
subsidies through FISP, and maize price stabilisation through FRA. Together
these two programmes have accounted for 30-60% of the total agriculture
budget between 2003 and 2014 (Figure 1).
Farmer Input Support Programme
Empirical evidence from IAPRI shows that in contrast to its major objectives
(Box 2), FISP has not succeeded in reducing rural poverty as the upfront costs,
to exclude poorer rural households (see Chisanga and Chapoto, 2015; Mason
and Tembo, 2015; Mason et al., 2013). Evidence on the impact of FISP suggests
that the programme has had minimal impact on poverty, food security, and
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Figure 1. Share of FRA and FISP to Total Agriculture Budget Allocations
Source: MoFNP various years; MAL various years.
smallholder farmers’ income due to implementation challenges. This includes
late delivery of inputs, with 22% and 35% of farmers reporting late receipt
of inputs in 2010 and 2014 respectively (Mason and Tembo, 2015; Mason et
al., 2013). Nkonde (2016) reported that the late receipt of inputs has been
of more than 85,000 metric tonnes. In addition, nationally representative farm
survey data consistently show that FISP fertiliser and maize seed have been
allocated disproportionately to households with relatively large farms and
greater asset wealth (Chisanga and Chapoto, 2015).
Under the traditional FISP, the private sector plays a limited role in
providing input and output marketing services. Provision of subsidies tends to
sideline commercial fertiliser purchases and in turn affects investments from
the private sector. Households accustomed to subsidies develop a dependency
syndrome as there is little evidence that farmers are graduating after two years
of being on the programme.
In terms of agricultural productivity, the traditional FISP fails to recognise
the spatial variability of soil fertility, and climatic conditions in the country. As a
result, the traditional FISP uses the blanket fertiliser recommendation of ‘one-size
the comparative advantage of different agro-ecological areas. Consequently, we
have seen the government continue investing heavily in D compound and urea
fertiliser, which is not suitable in large parts of the country where soils are acidic.
This has adverse implications on productivity and overall production.
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Box 2: Zambia’s Farmer Input Support Program: Objectives and Reality:
Objectives
• Introduced in 2002 in response to the severe droughts in the 2000/01
and 2001/02 agricultural years, as well as the low loan recovery rates
under the (loan-based) Fertiliser Credit Programme.
• Improving household and national food security, incomes, accessibility
to agricultural inputs by small-scale farmers through a subsidy and
building the capacity of the private sector to participate in the supply
of agricultural inputs thereby reducing direct role of government.
• Implicit goal of poverty reduction given that the programme is
about 56.3% of PRPs budget or 30% of the agricultural budget.
• Be a registered small-scale farmer and actively involved in farming
within the camp coverage area;
• Cultivate up to a maximum of 5 ha of land;
• Have the capacity to pay the prescribed farmer contribution
towards the total cost of an input pack.
Programme; and
• Not be a defaulter from any agricultural credit programme.
Reality:
marginally reduced from 78% to 76% since FISP was established in 2001.
low. Production growth is mainly through areas expansion rather
than productivity increases. Maize yields currently, average 2.1MT/h,
138% below the 5MT/ha as per the Malabo Declaration.
• Limited evidence of farmer graduation.
• Delays in input distribution regularly experienced by farmers.
• FISP impact on private sector participation. Limited private sector
participation under traditional FISP
* E-voucher implementing manual of 2016/17 has somewhat different
targeting criteria in terms of land cultivated. The programme’s target
was up to a maximum of 2 ha. In addition, the target was extended to
livestock farmers i.e. farmers raising 2 to 10 cattle, or 5 to 30 pigs, or
5 to 30 goats, or 20 to 100 chickens.
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Zambia is now in the process of reforming FISP to implement the subsidy
reforms by various stakeholders, the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) launched
the e-voucher program as a pilot in 13 selected districts1 during the 2015/2016
agricultural season with an initial target of 241,000 smallholder farmers. The
pilot was expanded to 39 districts during the 2016/17 farming season. In the
2017 budget speech, the Minister of Finance, Hon. Felix Mutati announced
intentions by the government to roll out the e-voucher to the rest of the country
in the 2017/18 season. Unfortunately, the 2017 budget to FISP increased by

alone were set at one million farmers.
Reforming FISP will require the government to cut expenditure on it, and
redirect these funds to investments in other key drivers of agricultural growth,
such as research and development, extension, feeder roads, and irrigation. The
the agricultural sector, but instead reduces funding to other key high return
investments. The implementation of the traditional FISP alongside E-FISP2 has
This heightened doubts whether the e-voucherwould be successful when it was
rolled out to the whole country in the 2017/18 agricultural season. IAPRI’s
E-FISP monitoring activities reveal that delayed funding due to the current tight
factors that has led to the pilot programme being labelled ‘a failure’ by advocates
of the traditional FISP. However, evidence from the e-voucher system in the
helped to involve more private sector participation in inputs distribution to
rural farmers (see Kuteya et al., 2016). Participating agro-dealers stocked more
diverse inputs in their shops giving farmers an opportunity to purchase inputs
of their choice. Thus, a well-managed E-FISP is likely to unlock the potential for
et al., 2016).
Output Subsidies through Food Reserve Agency
The verdict on FRA is equally bleak. Decades of government subsidy policies
have done little to address the high levels of poverty and inequality within the
rural sector given that maize production and sales from smallholder farmers
smallholder farmers to FRA are made by only 3-5% of farmers, and only
around 30% of all smallholder farmers sell any maize to FRA at all (Chisanga
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and Chapoto, 2015). In the context of a highly concentrated smallholder maize
market, government maize purchases at elevated prices serve to transfer
farmers. Given that most farmers, particularly the poorest farmers, are net
buyers of the maize, at the very least, the FRA does nothing to help the majority
of the rural poor which is in stark contrast to its mission of “taking wealth to
rural Zambia” (Box 3).
Box 3: Zambia’s Food Reserve Agency: Objectives and Reality
Objectives:
• The Food Reserve Agency (FRA) was created through the Food Reserve
Act, Cap 225 of the Laws of Zambia to administer the strategic food
reserves, engage in market facilitation, development and management
of the national storage facilities.
• FRA’s mission is to ensure national food security and provide
market access for rural-based smallholder farmers by maintaining a
sustainable national strategic food reserve.
• According to FRA, its main objective is to secure national food reserves
and take wealth to rural Zambia.
Source: http://fra.org.zm/about-us/
Reality:
• Limited market facilitation: FRA in most years has failed to adhere
to the statutory strategic reserve often buying above the prescribed
target, hence, failing to encourage private sector participation.
• Setting FRA prices above the prevailing market prices causes market
distortions.
• Interventions aimed at ensuring national food security and taking
wealth to rural Zambia have had very little impact on the incomes of
the poorest households.
majority of the rural poor who are not able to produce a surplus.
• FRA buys mostly from larger and relatively better-off farmers.
• High pan-territorial and pan-seasonal prices hurt about 30% of rural
farmers who are net buyers.
subsidised maize.
• Delayed payments to farmers.
farmers tend to follow the market offered by FRA.
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Buying beyond the prescribed strategic grain reserves target (currently
500,000 metric tonnes) has resulted in farmers being paid late, and made

continues to hurt farmers producing early maize; grain traders; and all millers
who do not have access to the discounted FRA maize price. These interventions

commercial banks thus imposing an opportunity cost to the growth of other
sectors within and outside agriculture.

national treasury for holding 500,000 metric tonnes of maize is approximately
US$26.7 million (excluding the procurement costs and FRA-related costs) using
a conservative storage loss of 10% over a period of eight months (for details
see Annex 1, Table A1). Scaling back the size of the strategic grain reserve
and using a combination of physical and non-physical stocks could save the
resources could be channelled for use in other socially robust programmes as
recommended in this paper.
Similarly, the strategy of selling maize to millers at subsidised prices
with the expectation that consumers will buy mealie meal at lower prices is
inaffective. It is more cost-effective to empower poor consumers through SCTs
in order for them to be able to afford food in times of high prices. SCTs are less
disruptive than targeting a selected group of well-connected millers or traders.
Low income urban consumers do not possess enough money to afford formal
sector retail prices for commercially packaged maize meal. Instead, they rely on
daily purchases of very small, very expensive repackaged maize meal (known
locally as “pamela”) purchased from vendors in the market (Mwiinga et al.,
2003; Mason et al., 2009). Chisanga (2016) shows that maize meal purchased
in repacks costs 27% more than the full 25kg bag. Additionally, it was noted
that those with little or no income resort to skipping meals or switching to less
preferred diets.
FISP and FRA Reforms and Investments into Alternative Effective Social
Protection Policies
There is irrefutable evidence that FISP and FRA have been costly and ineffective
in reducing rural poverty, raising productivity, and encouraging agricultural
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reforming the two programmes, and begins to invest in alternative strategies.
Going forward, a smarter subsidy regime which entails scaling back FISP
and FRA allows the release of limited treasury resources to alternative social
protection policies. These alternatives are far more cost-effective and can deliver
suggested herein consider the political economy of the current subsidy regime,
as well as the government objectives for implementing FISP and FRA which
include market development, increased agricultural productivity and poverty
reduction. The recommendations are structured around two key areas, namely;
a) the reform agenda of FISP and FRA, and b) investment in alternative cost
effective social protection policies and programmes.
Reforming the Food Reserve Agency
Discretionary and unpredictable FRA intervention continues to be one of the
greatest policy problems plaguing the maize marketing system and food security
in Zambia. This is because actual and potential government interventions by FRA
generate uncertainties for the private sector, leading to inaction and a perpetual
cycle of recurrent need for government intervention. Government, therefore,
needs to consider reforms to the Agency in order to achieve food security and
below.
Policy Options/Recommendations to Reform FRA
A. In order to create space for other effective social protection programmes, the
government needs to review the size of the country’s strategic grain reserve.
We propose that the government reduces the physical stock level of the
strategic reserve, as well as its procurement and management. In particular,
the physical reserve should be scaled back to 300,000 metric tonnes3 (MT)
from the current statutory 500,000MT and save the country approximately
US$44.7 million through buying and storing the extra 200,000MT (see Table
A1 for computation of the saving). In addition, the strategic reserve stock
should be procured and stored on behalf of the government by the private
sector through the commodity exchange and warehouse receipts system.
FRA’s role would therefore be to ensure compliance by all those involved in
the procurement and storage of the grain. Zambia can draw lessons on how
to engage the private sector in management of the strategic grain reserves
from Ghana and Tanzania (see Mulungu and Chilundika, 2016).
B. Where a well-managed early warning system incorporating both private
and public stakeholders exists, the current 500,000MT is considerably
more than the country needs if there’s an impending shock. The current
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Stocks Monitoring Committee is too ad-hoc and poorly equipped to deal
with a long-term food security strategy. It is important to note that, due to
improved irrigation capacity in the country, Zambia is now better placed to
deal with shocks without the need to hold such huge and expensive stock
levels. Commercial farmers can be contracted at short notice to produce
today are different from many years ago, with demand for non-maize food
products increasing. Finally, improvements in infrastructure over the years
imply that it may be cheaper to procure and import grain as compared to
physically holding all strategic reserves for at least eight months.
C. A well-managed strategic grain reserve and price stabilisation policy
allowing for clear triggers for maize purchases and releases by FRA needs
which is a key ingredient for encouraging private sector investments
in the agricultural sector. The failure to have a clearly established price
stabilisation policy causes panic and knee-jerk policies with few winners
and many losers.
Reforming the Farmer Input Support Programme
Government is commended for piloting the E-FISP and delivering input
pilot programme, the upscaling of the E-FISP is most welcome given its potential
development led by the private sector. This would in the long run reduce the
government’s discretionary expenditure on agricultural inputs. Nevertheless, as
indicated earlier the FISP programme (both the traditional FISP and E-FISP),
have become too large, gobbling ZMW 2.58 billion or approximately US$258
million equivalent to 52.6% of the MoA Budget) and are crowding out other costeffective public investments which have high potential to increase productivity
and sustainably reduce rural poverty in Zambia.
Policy Options/Recommendations to Reform FISP

and reduced rural poverty. This would then allow for the programme to be
scaled back over time to prioritise the implementation of other cost-effective
social protection alternatives. Therefore, going forward, there is need to cut the
overall spending on FISP and cap it at no more than US$105 million or not more
than 20% of the agriculture budget and reach 500,000 smallholder farmers.
Based on the 2017 budget, this will save the country up to US$178 million. A
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scaled back FISP delivered via the e-voucher system will improve targeting,
B. The E-FISP should prioritise some investment in soil testing that allows
for identifying appropriate fertilisers for each agro-ecological region, and
and timely, resources to enable them to disseminate this information
effectively.
phase need to be addressed if the programme is to be successfully rolled out to
a. Commit to the e-voucher now, so all the actors in the system, from banks
to local agriculture dealers have time to prepare properly;
b. Begin re-educating farmers now to ensure they understand the voucher
and to limit abuse of the system; and,
c. Ensure the activation process works effectively and that funds are in
place to enable farmers to use the cards in time for the planting season.
In particular, there is need to eliminate all human elements from all
processes that can be automated.
D. We can see from examples of where the implementation has worked well,
for example in Southern Province that the e-voucher is beginning to change
conditions above have been met, the e-voucher has:
a. Brought in more private sector participation in agro-input distribution,
thereby reducing public expenditure on the delivery of private goods
such as fertiliser and seed;
b. Ensured timely delivery and access to inputs by smallholder farmers;
c. Allowed farmers to buy inputs of their choice and started to develop
d. Reduced leakages through better targeting.
Alternative Cost-Effective Social Protection Policies
Scaling-back FISP and FRA is the right thing to do, but in isolation reducing
expenditure on ineffective agriculture subsidies will not deliver the objectives
stated in Boxes 2 and 3. Fiscal space created by reductions in expenditure on
these programmes should be used to invest in higher return social protection
alternatives that can deliver many of the objectives that FISP and FRA were
purported to be delivering.
IAPRI proposes three alternative programmes that the government could
invest in to deliver on the key objectives of reducing rural poverty, supporting
farmers, and creating a sustainable and diverse market for farmers’ agricultural
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products. So, in contrasting the government’s current approach, there is a case to
reinvest the saved resources. To alleviate poverty the government could spend
more on Social Cash Transfers (SCT), to reduce malnourishment and promote
child development the government could pursue an expanded Home-Grown
School Feeding Programme (HGSF) as well as provide nutrition support via a
Women, Infants and Children Programme (WIC). In the latter two examples,
direct support in the form of food would be provided to the households needing it
most, whilst indirectly supporting farmers by providing a reliable local market for
a diverse range of agricultural products including grains and livestock products.
When delivered alongside reforms of the FISP and FRA this dual support
approach will mean continued, better targeted support for farmers alongside
improved support for the poorest households in Zambia. So, what should these
new programmes look like, and why do we think they will be a success?
Robust Social Cash Transfers Programme
The SCT received a huge boost in the 2017 budget, increasing by 82.8% from
ZMW302 million to ZMW552 million (US$30.2 million to US$55.2 million).
However, even at this level, SCT is still a very small fraction of what is allocated
to FISP, about 19.3% in the 2017 budget. Further scaling-up SCT is desirable
given that an additional US$43.5 million for example, would mean that an extra
grant .4
Unlike FISP which targets food production among farmers, SCT tackles
food-entitlement failures indirectly, by providing cash to both farmers and nonfarmers. Hence, unconditional SCT can be used as an effective alternative to
FISP because the programme stimulates demand for local goods and services,
as most of the cash is spent on locally purchased goods. Further, SCT stimulates
enterprises in rural areas enabling the poor to protect themselves and their assets
against shocks, act as a support for development of human capital, in addition to
enabling them to defend their long-term income-generating potential (Samson
2009). In so doing SCT improves agricultural productivity – due to increased
spending on agricultural inputs – in contexts where the primary constraint was
working capital rather than land.
Furthermore, the unconditional SCT has been found to have a positive
effect on improving consumption and reducing poverty among participating
households (Van Ufford et al., 2016). In addition, SCT has been shown to improve
the nutritional status, health, and number of school-going children. Another
recent evaluation of the Child Grant Programme (CGP) by Handa et al., (2016)
showed that the increase in consumption observed among households receiving
the SCT was close to the per capita value of the transfer, as is the expectation
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among very poor households. Consumption patterns among recipients also
showed increased dietary diversity from starchy foods to protein containing
foods (Chisanga and Zulu-Mbata, 2016). Additionally, due to SCT funds being
spent locally within the communities where they were disbursed, economic
activities in the local area were strengthened. SCTs are also linked to improved
et al. 2016).
Universal Home Grown School Feeding Programme
The school feeding programme implemented by the Government of Zambia in
collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP) is acknowledged as an
effective initiative that can simultaneously address the marketing challenge that
farmers face, address the high malnutrition rate in school-age going children,
and encourage school enrolment and attendance. Therefore, if the FRA is scaled
down, funds saved could be channelled into a universal HGSF.5 The programme
is multi-sectoral incorporating agriculture, education, health and nutrition, local
HGSF as a tool for food security and poverty reduction (Kalaluka, 2016).
Currently, the HGSF Programme covers 38 Districts in nine provinces of
pulses (beans and cowpeas), and cooking oils for a total of 182 days/. The
total cost of procuring the commodities in 2017 is estimated at K87.2 million
(US$8.72 million), translating into about ZMW95 (US$9.5) per child per year
(WFP, 2015; ILO, 2016). There is a total of 3.4 million school-going children in
rural areas in Zambia, so doubling the number of children supported by the
programme would mean that 61% of the rural schoolgoing children would
management costs. The bulk of this money would go directly to the farmers who
were providing the food to the schools, thereby promoting local markets and

farmers’ productive capacity by linking them to a predictable market – in this
case the school. By purchasing food requirements locally, the programme
promotes participation of local smallholder farmers in value chains through
market mechanisms. Farmers are reached through cooperatives, and capacitated
with skills in crop aggregation to guarantee quality assurance. Through this
approach, schools provide local farmers with a predictable outlet for their
products, leading to a stable income, more investments and higher productivity.
Due to the diversity of food requirements, the school feeding programme
than maize alone.
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Zambia can learn from one of the most celebrated school feeding programme
in Brazil.6 School feeding in Brazil is a duty of the State, and a universal right of
students enrolled in public basic education, granted by the Constitution (Sidaner
et al., 2013). The Brazilian programme is exemplary in its scope, reaching more
than 45 million students, with an allocated budget of some US$1.9 billion for
2012, which is equivalent to US$44 per student per annum.
Women, Infants and Children Programme
Savings from FISP and FRA could also be spent on a social protection programme
that deals with health, malnutrition, and agricultural marketing problems.
Despite increased interventions on nutrition, undernutrition still remains
a widespread problem. Zambia suffers from some of the highest levels of
undernutrition in the world. The most affected are women in the reproductive
children and women suffer from one or more forms of malnutrition, including
low birth weight, wasting, stunting, underweight, and multiple micronutrient

Zambia (UNICEF, 2009; DFID, 2011).
Introducing a programme that deals with malnutrition among pregnant
women, and a programme for infants and children would create a market for a
variety of agricultural commodities and products, as well as provide nutrition
education and supplemental nutritious foods to help keep underprivileged
pregnant women, new mothers, infants, and children under 5 healthy and
strong. Target families could receive a variety of healthier choices in their food
items, including; fresh milk, eggs, fruits and vegetables, whole grains, and infant
foods. All these products can be supplied by local farmers.
The WIC programme has been implemented in the United States of America
since 1972 and over the years the programme has greatly expanded. The existing
body of research shows various impacts of the programme on child health and
household food security. For example, studies have shown that the programme
improves birth weights andimproves women’s prenatal care (Bitler and Currie
2004; Hoynes, Page, and Stevens 2011; Kreider, Pepper, and Roy 2014). Hanson
and Oliveria (2009), estimated that the farm sector received almost US$1.3
billion from the sale of commodities that are used in producing the US$4.6
billion in WIC retail food sales.
Notably, introducing this programme in Zambia would not be to the scale
agriculture subsidies. Providing this programme to an estimated 250,000
women and 300,000 children would cost US$46.2 million if support is at the
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same level as the current SCT, ZMW70 (or US$7) per recipient per month.
programme, providing more indirect support to the industry whilst delivering
improved nutrition outcomes for Zambian women, infants and for malnourished,
impoverished Zambian children.
Opportunities and costs of these proposals
There is clearly a strong economic and social case for reform that is set out in
the previous sections. Re-focussing support away from ineffective agricultural
subsidies towards cost-effective social protection polices will deliver better
social outcomes in Zambia. However, in proposing these alternatives, we
must also determine if these proposals are affordable. With the government
committed to economic recovery through the Zambia Plus plan, and a potential
Proposals for reforms need to be affordable in addition to delivering improved
outcomes for Zambian citizens.
agricultural subsidies and provides some indicative costs for new social
protection programmes. This clearly shows that the approach advocated for
in this paper is affordable and will help constrain spending, in addition to
delivering improved support to those Zambians who need it most.
S/N

Proposal

Saving/
(Cost) (US$)

Objectives of Programme

1

FRA reform: Scale back
44.7 million
strategic reserve stock
level to 300,000MT from
the current 500,000MT

• Reformed FRA to focus on
food security, ensuring less
market distortion.
• Further savings can be made
if government procures the
reserves via the commodity
exchange with maize stored

2

Cap total FISP
178 million
expenditure at no more
than US$100 million and
target at least 500,000
smallholder farmers

• Reformed E-FISP provides
more cost-effective and

e-voucher.

• Promotes competitive
private sector input
provision.

taking account of local
conditions and enabling
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3

Scale-up SCT

(43.5
million)

• SCTs focused on poorest and
most vulnerable households
and target poverty
reduction.
• SCTs have a positive
multiplier effect on the
economy as cash creates
an effective demand for
food and non-food products
helping local economies to
grow.

additional 500,000

4

Support one million
more children via the
Home Grown School
Feeding (HGSF)
programme.

(8.7 million)

• HGSF will not only ensure
that children have access
to regular meals, but also
create local markets for a
diverse range of farming
products.

5

Provide nutritious food
vouchers to 500,000
women and children

(46.2
million)

• WIC provides nutritional
support to mothers
and infants, reducing
malnutrition, and supporting
child development. At the
same time the programme
provides a market for local
farmers.

6

Net saving/(Cost)

124.3.8
million+

• Savings be invested into
key drivers of agricultural
growth and other high
return programmes

Table 1. Summary of opportunities and costs of proposals
Source: Authors’ recommendations and calculations from 2017 Budget
Conclusion
In a liberalised market economy, the private sector is expected to effectively
serve the needs of the millions of rural farmers and urban consumers, whilst
the government is expected to provide a conducive environment and regulatory
intervention, the private sector in Zambia has often been blamed for failing to
be responsive to the smallholder farmers’ needs. The perceived failure of the
market has led the Government of Zambia into spending colossal amounts of
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money on FISP and FRA. However, this paper has presented a case for reforms
and consideration of reinvestment of public resources into more cost-effective,
and multifaceted social protection programmes which involve the private sector.
Another recommendation of this article is that the government should redirect
government funding to key drivers of agricultural growth. This reorientation of
spending, away from FRA and FISP should go towards increased investment in
public goods including: irrigation development as a means to mitigate drought and
improve productivity; crop, soil, and livestock science research and development - to
and technologies; extension programmes, particularly focusing on effective and
appropriate input use, and integrated soil fertility management practices to
improve soils and raise crop response to inorganic fertiliser; and rural physical
infrastructure development especially feeder roads. In addition, the government
needs to improve the timing of budget releases. Effective monitoring systems need
to be designed to increase budgeting transparency and accountability aimed at
reducing or eliminating delayed budget releases.
Last but not least, the country needs to enact an Agricultural Marketing Act
to guide all private and public agricultural marketing activities in Zambia. In the
mixed policy environment, the government coexists with the private sector as an
unfairly large competitor, and this hinders the development of the agricultural
sector. Complete government withdrawal from the market is neither realistic
nor desirable. However, the government must avoid policies that crowd out
private sector participation, and should instead seek to facilitate market growth,
as well as make every effort to leverage private sector investments. Therefore,
an Agricultural Marketing Act will provide guidance on the involvement of the
government in the maize market, fertiliser, seed, crops, and livestock markets
bringing the most needed policy transparency and predictability that will
enhance the market for smallholder farmers.
Endnotes
1 Chibombo, Kabwe, Kapiri Mposhi, Mumbwa and Chisamba in Central Province; Ndola
District in Copperbelt Province; Chongwe district in Lusaka Province; and Chikankata,
Choma, Kalomo, Mazabuka, Monze and Pemba districts in Southern Province
2 The difference between the traditional FISP and E-FISP is the delivery mechanism. The
traditional FISP involves the government physically delivering the inputs (currently
limited to fertiliser and seed) sourced from few suppliers through a tender process.
Whilst, the E-FISP involves giving targeted farmers an input voucher that can be redeemed
electronically through licensed agro-dealers. Delivery of inputs is the responsibility of
private sector dealers.
3 Before 2013, the statutory maize strategic reserve was 300,000 MT based on monthly
human and industrial demand of 100,000 MT per month for at least three months before
imports could arrive in the country. The irrigation capacity of the country then was limited.
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disabilities receive double the amount i.e. ZMW280.
5 The Home Grown School Feeding Programme, is a social safety net which uses food
as a value transfer to schoolchildren recognizing that school health and nutrition are
6 Established in the 1950s, the PNAE is one of the most important strategies of Brazil’s food
and nutrition security policy. Its large coverage and innovative design act to strengthen
family farming, while promoting access to adequate and healthy diets in all public schools.
For more details on the evolution of the PNAE in Brazil, see Otsuki and Arce (2007).
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Appendix
Table A1: Cost to the National Treasury for Holding 500,000 Metric Tonnes by FRA
Description

Unit

Quantity

Price/
Cost per
unit ZMW

Total ZMW

Total US$

1. Cost of new crop purchased July - October 2016
Value based on purchase price

MT

500,000

1,700

850,000,000

85,000,000

Logistics costs

MT

500,000

200

100,000,000

10,000,000

Estimated 8 months carry costs (Oct
‘16 to May ‘17) *

MT

500,000

90

45,000,000

4,500,000

Rebagging costs

MT

500,000

100

37,500,000

3,750,000

Estimated total costs of new crop
purchased July-October 2016

1,032,500,000

103,250,000

Translated Cost/MT as at end May
2017

2,065

207

2. Value of 2016 Crop at May 2017 Export Parity Prices*
Export Value by May 2017 based on
Export Parity Price to Harare

0

2,600

0

0

500,000

1,700

850,000,000

85,000,000

Less 10% storage losses

85,000,000

8,500,000

Net value of 2016 crop

765,000,000

76,500,000

Estimated total costs of new crop
purchased July-October 2016

1,032,500,000

103,250,000

Gross Cost

1,032,500,000

103,250,000

Net value of 2016 crop

765,000,000

76,500,000

Gross Export Revenue

765,000,000

76,500,000

LOSS

267,500,000

26,750,000

FRA maize sold at cost local market
price

MT

3. Summary of Costs to Treasury
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Note: The following assumptions are used in computing the above costs to
the Treasury: (a) Exchange rate 1US$/10ZMW; (b) 2016 FRA Purchasing
Price/50kg bag at 85 ZMW; (c) Logistics cost/50kg bag (transportation, loading
(e) storage losses estimated at 10 percent.
Table A2
2015/16 E-Voucher Pilot Implementation Challenges

•

•

•
•

•
•

e-cards;
Rising fertiliser prices due to the depreciation of the Kwacha that nearly
made the e-voucher less attractive to the traditional FISP. Government
had to top-up the value of the voucher from 1,400 to 2,100 Kwacha,
inclusive of farmer contribution of 400 Kwacha;
There were cases in Central province of deliberate effort by some MoA
staff to derail the implementation of e-voucher pilot in support of the
traditional FISP. MoA’s quick action to discipline renegade staff solved
the problem;
Reported selective activation of e-cards, a problem that led to delayed
access of inputs by some farmers;
Reported incidences of farmers surrendering their non-activated
cards to agro-dealers to access inputs in advance. This could have led
to some farmers being disadvantaged as some agro-dealers might
have redeemed the cards in the absence of the farmers;
The charging of a redemption fee of 7 Kwacha affected some farmers
as they could not use the full value of the e-card; and
E-voucher redemption system did not have the capability to identify
the type of inputs redeemed by farmers limiting the usefulness of
data captured. The inability to identify the inputs redeemed makes
it impossible to map the demand for various inputs, information that
will be useful for input suppliers and monitoring the extent to which
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